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Abstract- Traditionally, companies aiming to achieve
competition among suppliers have used sealed bidding
procedures in their sourcing processes. The advances in
information technology and in particular the Internet now allow
these companies to use different and more complex auction
mechanisms. In particular multidimensional auctions are a
natural extension of the standard sealed-bid auctions, but these
auctions raise a whole host of issues that have been little
investigated. In this article we focus on one of these issues,
namely the role of information feedback given during the
auction process. We describe various feedback policies and
analyze the expected impact on the performance of the auction
mechanism using the criteria of speed of convergence, allocative
efficiency and Pareto optimality. This can help both researchers
and practitioners in a more detailed and thorough analysis of
electronic auctions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Although electronic markets have been in existence for over a
decade and especially the last few years have grown
exponentially, paralleling the growth of the Internet, the
accompanying theory is lagging behind substantially. In this
paper we will make a start with developing a theory for a
particular type of auction that holds great promise for
practical applications, namely the multidimensional auction.
Although currently consumer auctions such as eBay, Onsale,
Yahoo Auctions and Amazon Auctions are drawing most of
the attention, the business-to-business auction market is
expected to surpass the consumer auction market by several
orders of magnitude (InformationWeek, 1999). In this
*

research we will focus on the business-to-business context of
electronic auctions.
In the majority of business-to-business transactions, the
details of the transaction are not fixed in advance, but rather
they are determined through some form of negotiation
process. This negotiation process can take many forms, from
unstructured bargaining between two parties to the highspeed market environments of stock exchanges to all kinds of
auctioning procedures. In this paper we will focus on the
latter category.
Traditional auction literature has dealt mainly with auctions
being used as a mechanism to sell goods. In this case the
bidders are the potential buyers and the bid taker is the seller
and the auction mechanism is used to determine the price of
the good being auctioned. If we were to model a common
procurement setting (in other words using an auction as a
mechanism to buy goods) with multiple suppliers competing
for the buyer’s order the roles of bidders and bid taker would
be reversed. In that case the bidders are the sellers and the bid
taker is the buyer.
This reversal from seller-driven to buyer-driven alone does
not inherently change the auction and in principle traditional
auction theory still applies. However in the reverse auction
(i.e. procurement) case, the bid taker is much more likely to
solicit bids that are based on more than just price alone.
Bidders now would not submit a one-dimensional bid of just
price, but instead submit a bid consisting of a vector of
characteristics such as price, quantity, quality, delivery time
and warranty. This provides another rationale for looking at
multidimensional auctions, however this is an area that is
little addressed in the current management, IS or economics
literature.

Part of this work was done while the first author was visiting the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center in Hawthorne, NY,
whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. Anant Jhingran and Sunil Noronha and especially Mike Rothkopf provided
valuable feedback on earlier versions. However, any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the authors.
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The paper is set up as follows: section II will review the
existing
literature
on
electronic
auctions
and
multidimensional auctions, drawing from both the IS field as
well as economics. Section III outlines the general approach
we use to model multidimensional auctions. In section IV we
turn our attention to the little-addressed role of information
feedback given during the auction process. We outline
several feedback policies and analyze the impact they have
on the performance of the auction mechanism. Performance
is judged on three criteria: speed of convergence, allocative
efficiency and Pareto optimality. In addition, the concept of
an informational balance of power is outlined. Section V
concludes and also describes how these theories could be
validated empirically.

II. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

An important issue when analyzing electronic markets (and
auctions in particular) is the effect they have on the prices of
traded goods and services. Bakos (1991) originally
hypothesized that due to increased competition and less
overhead, prices in an electronic market would be lower than
in a traditional market. Lee (1998) and Crowston (1997)
among others have empirically tested this reduced price
hypothesis in several situations, but these tests have not led to
unequivocal results as in some cases prices actually went up
in an electronic market. Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski
(1998) also showed mixed consequences of the usage of
electronic markets and they suggest that the scope of the
electronic market (i.e. which phases of the transaction are
supported) is an important variable that has been overlooked
thus far.
Koppius, Van Heck and Wolters (1998) analyzed an
intermediate stage between a traditional and an electronic
auction when they investigated the introduction of screenbased auctioning in a large Dutch flower auction.
Traditionally the flowers were driven into the auction hall on
carts, but the logistical complexities of this process led the
flower auction to experiment with screen-based auctioning.
Instead of physically showing the flowers, an image of the
flower was shown. Koppius, van Heck and Wolters (1998)
showed that in the new situation the worse product
representation (as perceived by the bidders) caused a
significant price drop.
Despite the obvious practical relevance, research specific to
electronic auctions is not very extensive. Van Heck and
Vervest (1998) provided a typology of web-based auctions,
based on the numbers of buyers and sellers. In the businessto-business context under investigation here, we are dealing
with procurement auctions and to a lesser extent sales
auctions. Turban (1997) gave an overview of some of the

products that are being auctioned electronically and outlined
some potential benefits, such as cost reduction and inventory
clearance. A much more extensive overview is given by
Lucking-Reiley (1999). Wrigley (1997) suggested that
electronic markets in general and auctions in particular will
occur when one of the following characterizes the goods to be
sold: perishability, scarcity, possibility to deliver
electronically or to a geographically constrained market (such
as second-hand goods for instance). Their hypotheses were
partially confirmed by Van Heck, Koppius and Vervest
(1998), who compared four electronic auctions on the
Internet and identified some common success-factors, the
most important ones being increased scale of the market for
the seller and greater market visibility for the buyer.

With regards to the role of information technology when
analyzing auctions, we take the following stance. Like
Shapiro and Varian (1998), we contend that ICT does not so
much change the fundamental characteristics of the general
auction process, as the economic principles behind auctions
are still valid, but rather it enables new trading mechanisms
to be implemented that were previously unknown or
infeasible. Examples include Drexler and Miller (1988),
Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad (1995), Varian (1995), Miller
(1996), Clearwater (1996), Gomber, Schmidt and Weinhardt
(1998) and Koppius (1998). For example, Drexler and Miller
(1988) describe what they refer to as the ‘escalator bidding
algorithm’. They liken bidding strategies to escalators: a
bidder chooses the initial height of the bid (the step at which
to enter the escalator) and the rate of increase per time unit
(the speed of the escalator); also he can enter bids on
different types of escalators at the same time that progress at
different speeds. Clearly this sort of bidding strategy would
be hard to implement without IT.
This view of IT’s role allows us to use results from
(microeconomic) auction theory when analyzing electronic
auctions. Most auction theory mainly deals with the
traditional auction of an indivisible good (possibly multiple
units of that good), with the auction process being conducted
on price. The past few years some progress has been made in
researching extensions to this framework, partly in response
to criticism that the assumptions of a gametheoretic/mechanism design approach to auction theory are
not very realistic in a practical setting. See Rothkopf and
Harstad (1994) for an overview of such criticism.
The class of multidimensional auctions forms one very
interesting extension to the standard auction framework. In
these auctions, instead of consisting of just a single parameter
(i.e. price), a bid consists of a vector of attributes such as
quantity, quality, delivery time etc. in addition to price. When
auctions are used for procurement, such parameters are
generally not fixed in advance, but instead are determined by
the bidding (sometimes called tendering) process. As argued
before, this makes the multidimensional auction a very likely
candidate to be used in an electronic business-to-business

search

market, also because of the low cost of fulfilling the much
higher informational requirements of such a mechanism.

There have been several authors who investigated auctions in
a context of procurement or internal sourcing, which exhibits
multidimensional characteristics as shown, although they
have not always specifically identified it as multidimensional
auctions per se.
Van Damme (1997) gives an overview of the theory and use
of auctions as a procurement mechanism. Dasgupta and
Spulber (1989/1990) showed that setting a fixed quantity to
be procured is sub-optimal and that instead the decision of the
quantity to be procured should depend on the received bids.
They also investigated the multiple sourcing problem in
which the quantity to be procured is to be distributed over
multiple suppliers and gave an optimal two-stage mechanism
for this case.
Bushnell and Oren (1995) looked at the problem of setting
production levels and selecting an internal supplier for an
intermediate product and described how theoretically a
multidimensional auction could be used to set an efficient
transfer price for that intermediate product.
Thiel (1988) was the first to specifically investigate
multidimensional auctions. He showed that if the bid taker
(i.e. the procurer) has a publicly known, fixed budget and
does not value any savings, the multidimensional case can be
reduced to the one-dimensional case of a normal auction.
Unfortunately these assumptions are not entirely realistic
from a practical point of view.
Che (1993) looked at three different auction mechanisms for
two-dimensional auctions (on price and quality), based on
actual practices at the US Department of Defense. He showed
that under certain circumstances the three investigated
mechanisms yield the same expected revenue and that in all
circumstances, quality is either undervalued or overvalued
from the buyer’s point of view. In his analysis, he assumed
that the costs of the bidding firms were independent. Branco
(1997) extended Che’s analysis by deriving an optimal
auction mechanism for the more realistic case when the
bidding firms’ costs are correlated.
Cripps and Ireland (1994) approached the problem from a
slightly different point of view when they investigated
auctions in which the bid taker sets threshold levels for the
various characteristics that are not known to the bidders.
They analyzed three different bid evaluation schemes,
partially based on the tendering of UK television licenses.
The difference between the schemes was the order in which
each bid was evaluated (price first, quality second; quality
first, price second; price and quality simultaneously) and they
found that the three schemes produced the same results.

Note that sometimes the terminology multidimensional
auctions is used to denote combinatorial or combinational
auctions (Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad 1998). Analysis of
these auctions generally focuses on bundling and valuation
issues of bids and should therefore not be confused with
issues related to the multidimensional auctions described
here, although some progress is being made on unifying the
two types (Koppius 1999).

III. A GENERAL MODEL OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTIONS

Consider the following simple procurement model in which
there is one buyer (i.e. bid taker) and n suppliers (i.e.
bidders). The bid taker has K attributes on which the buyer
must bid in order for a bid to be valid, hence all bids must be
K-dimensional vectors. The attributes may be any
combination of monetary and non-monetary attributes.
Possible attributes can include a fixed-price component, a
variable-price component, payment schedule, quantity
offered, various product quality attributes and issues such as
warranty policies.
A bid by firm i is denoted by

b i = (b1,i ;...; bK ,i ) with each

separate bk,i denoting the level of attribute k in bid i. The bid
taker has a private utility function U(b) that denotes the utility
he derives from a bid; this function converts both monetary
and non-monetary attributes into a utility. The bid taker can
choose to reveal his utility function (either truthfully or not)
or he can keep it secret and perhaps reveal different
information.
Analogous to the reserve price in conventional auctions, the
bid taker has several constraints βs(b) (s = 1,…,S) regarding
the values of the attributes, resulting in a feasible bid region
for the bid taker denoted by BR*. These constraints may be
the just simple minimum or maximum values or more
complex functions describing some of the tradeoffs between
attributes (say for instance the maximum price increase for
faster delivery, possibly dependent on the quality level).
These constraints may or may not be communicated to the
bidders, depending on how much private information the bid
taker is willing to retain. The bid taker tries to maximize U(b)
s.t. b ∈ BR*.

Similarly, each of the bidders faces several constraints ci,t(b)
(t = 1,…,T) regarding the sets of attributes that he can offer,
resulting in a feasible bid region for each bidder denoted by
BRi. These are constraints that have to do with internal
production function, minimum price levels etc. They are
assumed to be private information, but not necessarily
independent. In fact in this procurement context they are very
likely to be quite strongly affiliated. Furthermore, each bidder
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has a utility function πi(b) which he tries to maximize s.t. b ∈
BRi.
There are several different generic auction types the bid
taker/auctioneer could employ and in particular the sealed-bid
case is very common in practice. One of the reasons for this
is that the open outcry model would be very costly in terms of
communication unless the bidders all congregate in one
place, which is rather cumbersome, particularly when dealing
with a geographically dispersed set of suppliers. One of the
disadvantages of a single-shot auction is that there is no
opportunity for the bidders to react to other bids, but instead
estimates of other bidders strategies have to be used.
Speaking from a purely theoretical point of view, this should
yield the same results, but in practice things often work out
differently. For instance, market maker FreeMarkets Online
claims on their website (www.freemarkets.com) that they
achieve savings of up to 25% when using an English auction
instead of a single-shot auction.
Therefore we focus on a multiple-round setting, so that
bidders get a chance to update their initial bids, based on the
information feedback they receive from the auctioneer. This
line of reasoning is similar to one of the rationales for the
FCC auction design (Cramton 1995). This not only gives the
bidders the opportunity to react to other bidders, but more
importantly they have more options to explore the highly
complex bid space of multidimensional auctions with all its
potential tradeoffs. The information feedback given to the
bidders may include information on their own bid, such as
their bid score or bid ranking, but also information on other
bidders’ bids. The information feedback may be public or
private or a mixture of the two. The updating may occur
synchronously, meaning that all bidders have to submit a bid
before feedback is given and the next bidding round
commences, or it may occur asynchronously, in which case it
becomes an English variant of the multidimensional auction.

IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION FEEDBACK

To show the relevance of information feedback, we will first
describe a very simple deterministic situation. Assume a
procurement setting where there are two dimensions, namely
cost and delivery time. There are two bidders competing for
the order through an English auction. Bidder 1 can deliver at
a cost of c1=900 and delivery time d1=”on time”. Bidder 2 on
the other hand can deliver at a cost of c2=1000, but can
deliver d2=”early”. Suppose the bid taker values earlier
delivery at the cost equivalent of 10. If the bid taker truthfully
reveals this information, the end result will be that bidder 1
will win with a winning bid of 989. However, suppose the bid
taker were to tell the bidders he values earlier delivery by 90.
Bidder 1 would still win, but now with a winning bid of 909
instead of 989. Although the example is not particularly

realistic, since it assumes complete information on the bid
taker’s side for instance, it does show that different
information feedback policies do have an impact on the
outcome of the auction. Additionally it shows that sometimes
the bid taker can profit from misrepresenting his private
information. In general, misrepresentation is profitable for the
bid taker when used to push the most efficient bidder to the
limit, effectively by ‘subsidizing’ the second-most efficient
bidder.
Another reason to investigate the effects of different auction
feedback policies (other than utility of the bid) is that using a
utility function sometimes is not possible or desirable. For
instance, it may be illegal to misrepresent it (for instance in
government procurement) or announcing a utility function
may give monopoly power to one or more bidders. Or the bid
taker simply may not have an explicit utility function, but
instead only be able to do pairwise comparisons1. A third
reason is that it is an area that has received little attention thus
far, both from theorists and experimentalists (Kagel and Roth
1995, Ch. 7). Yet with the increasing popularity of auctions
and in particular the more complex electronic auction
mechanisms enabled by information technology, a theory on
the effects of information feedback is necessary more than
ever.

Any information feedback policy can be thought of to
comprise as many as five categories of information elements:
1.

Actual bids

2.

Bid scores

3.

Bid rankings

4.

Bid taker’s utility function

5.

Bidder identities

The first category gives information regarding the bids
themselves. This is usually done in conjunction with elements
of categories 2 and 3, such as revealing the highest bid. An
interesting hybrid policy would be to not reveal information
about the bids received, but instead give each bidder a
number of alternatives that would improve on their current
bid (and perhaps top the current highest bid). This would
make it easier for the bidders to spot mutually beneficial
tradeoffs in the multidimensional space. See figure 1 for an
illustration of such tradeoffs in a two-dimensional case with a
bid being made on price and delivery time. Two iso-utility
curves are drawn, one for an arbitrary bidder, one for the bid
taker. The curves correspond to the utility of the bid being
1

Note that using pairwise comparisons will only be
equivalent to using a utility function when an unlimited
amount of pairwise comparisons can be done accurately and
with zero cost.
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fastest improvement upon the current bid. This corresponds
to the normal vector of the utility curve at the bid point (see
also the arrows in figure 1).

Delivery time
f* (bid taker’s iso-utility curve)

The fifth category constitutes the revelation of the identity of
the bidders. The identity of the highest bidder will generally
only be revealed at the end of the auction, but it is of course
possible to reveal the identity of the current high bidder
during the auction. In other cases one may want to have a
completely public auction in the sense that the identity of
each bidder is known at all times.

I

II

III
g* (bidder’s iso-utility curve)

Price

Figure 1: Mutually beneficial tradeoffs

made by that particular bidder, i.e. the bid made is at one of
the intersection points of the two curves. The arrows indicate
the direction of utility improvement for each party. The bid
taker (i.e. buyer) prefers a lower price and a faster delivery
time, the bidder (i.e. seller) prefers a higher price and a later
delivery time. Areas I and III are areas in which any bid
would yield increased utility for both parties. A bid in area II
would yield decreased for both parties. A bid in the
remaining areas would yield a utility increase for one party
and a decrease for the other party. Note however that we have
assumed no further restrictions on the attributes, such as a
maximum price the bid taker is willing to pay or a minimum
delivery time the bidder can meet for instance. These may
prevent areas I and III from being feasible bids for both
parties. Note also how this example illustrates some of the
issues that arise in multidimensional auctions and not in the
standard one-dimensional auctions on price (due to the zerosum nature of standard auctions).
The second category refers to the revelation of the scores of a
bid, with score being the bid taker’s utility. Note that (bearing
in mind the information manipulation example given earlier)
the utility revealed need not necessarily correspond to the
actual utility of the bid taker, since misrepresentation may be
profitable. Also note that revealing a utility is only
meaningful if the scale of the utility is (partially) known to
the bidders.
The third category reveals information about the relative
ranking of the bid among all bids received, based on the bid
taker’s (possibly misrepresented) utility. This information can
be enhanced if the total number of bids received is revealed
as well.
The information from the second and third categories in
principle allows bidders to make partial inferences about the
bid taker’s utility function after a number of rounds.
However, the bid taker can also choose to reveal some
information about his utility function directly and that is the
fourth category. He may choose to reveal the utility function
entirely, but another option might be to reveal the direction of

To analyze the effects of different feedback policies on the
performance of the auction mechanism, we need criteria by
which to judge performance, as performance can be measured
in different ways. We focus on three performance measures:
1.

Speed of convergence

2.

Pareto optimality

3.

Allocative efficiency

Speed of convergence especially is an important issue in
auctions where transactions need to occur at a rapid rate. A
typical (one-dimensional) example is the Dutch flower
auctions. Since these deal with very large volumes of
perishable goods, each individual transaction needs to be
completed quickly. Hence the adoption of the Dutch auction
clock system that is capable of completing a transaction every
four seconds (Kambil and Van Heck 1998). No other auction
method can be expected to achieve this speed. In an auction
of a rare painting on the other hand, speed of convergence is
much less likely to be an issue, which makes an English
auction a more likely choice.
Pareto optimality in a multidimensional auction is measured
at the dyad level of (winning) bidder-bid taker. A (winning)
bid is Pareto optimal if no feasible bid can be made which is
a Pareto improvement, i.e. no mutually beneficial bids exist
for the bid taker and that particular bidder. Note that this not
necessarily means that the bid taker’s utility is maximized.
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the most efficient
bidder makes the actual winning bid. In standard onedimensional auctions, allocative efficiency is achieved when
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction. In the
reverse case under consideration here, it means that the
bidder with the lowest cost structure wins the auction. So a
multidimensional auction is efficient if, given a winning bid,
there does not exist a different bidder who could make a
feasible bid (feasible for both parties) that would improve the
bid taker’s utility.
Loosely speaking, efficiency ensures that the eventual trade
occurs between the ‘right’ trading partners, optimality
ensures that the total surplus of that trade is maximized.
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It is important to note that a winning bid can be Pareto
optimal, but not allocatively efficient and vice versa. An
optimal, inefficient winning bid can occur when the winning
bidder has Pareto-optimized his own bid relative to the bid
taker’s utility (no Pareto improvements possible, areas I and
III in fig. 1 are not feasible), yet there may be a different
bidder that could outbid him (allocative inefficiency), but that
bidder has not made such a bid. A non-Pareto-optimal,
allocatively efficient winning bid can occur when there are no
bidders that could outbid the current highest bidder
(allocatively efficient), yet his current bid could be Pareto
improved upon (areas I and III in fig. 1 are feasible, yet not
being bid in). In both cases, the complexity of the bid space
and unfamiliarity with the bid taker’s preferences lead to
performance degradations that could be ameliorated by
giving proper feedback.

If we look more closely at these three performance criteria,
we can distinguish between two information-related aspects
that influence these criteria: direction for improving the bid
and a sense of competition among the bidders.
Optimality is something that has mainly to do with the shape
of the utility curves: where do the regions of Pareto
improvement lie? This requires information feedback about
the direction in which to move the bid in order to achieve
optimality.
Efficiency on the other hand has to ensure that the most
efficient bidder wins, meaning that competition among
bidders has to be fierce. The more information bidders have
about their position relative to other bidders, the greater their
perception of competition and therefore the more aggressive
their bidding behavior.
Speed of convergence is improved by both kinds of
information: more aggressive bidding (through a higher sense
of competition) in a direction of fast improvement (through
better direction information) will lead to a quicker
convergence.
In summary, we have the following three propositions:

Proposition 1: Feedback that conveys more information
about the direction in which to improve the bid will have a
positive impact on the optimality of the auction.

Proposition 2: Feedback that conveys a higher sense of
competition among the bidders will have a positive impact on
efficiency of the auction.

Proposition 3: Both types of feedback will have a positive
impact on the speed of convergence of the auction.

In Table 1, we outline several feedback policies. Based on the
informational content with regards to direction and sense of
competition of each feedback policy, in conjunction with
propositions 1-3, each feedback policy is rated on the
performance criteria of speed of convergence, optimality and
efficiency. These are rough and qualitative ratings, as a useful
(mathematical) formalization of the directional content and
the sense-of-competitional content does not seem very likely.
Note that we have left out feedback policies dealing with
whether or not to reveal bidder’s identity, as the effects of
that are indeterminate to the best of our knowledge.

Feedback

Speed

Optimality

Efficiency

Bid highest? (yes/no)

-

-

-

1 alternative

-

o

-

+

+

o

Rank of bid

o

-

+

Highest bid

o

o

+

All bids + ranking

+

+

+

Bid score + highest
bid score

-

-

o

Bid score + all other
bid scores

o

-

+

Bid taker’s utility
function

o

+

-

Direction of fastest
improvement

+

+

-

n alternatives (n
relatively large)

Table 1: Feedback policies and the effect on auction performance

The performance measures outlined above all deal with the
economic performance of the auction mechanism. As
propositions 1-3 outline, more (appropriate) information will
improve economic performance. However, this is a somewhat
myopic view of auction mechanism performance. Auctions in
general and especially in the business-to-business
environment do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in
a set of economic and social relationships that may be
affected by the outcome of the auction and these relationships
can have a large effect on the performance of future auctions
(Smith 1989). This implies that the information revealed in
one auction will influence future auctions.
For instance, if the bid taker were to reveal his utility
function, not only would he possibly give monopoly rents to
one or more bidders, but more importantly it would likely
reveal sensitive competitive information about his internal
cost and production structure. Bidders in future auctions can
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subsequently use this information against the bid taker. So
even though the short-term effect on the economic
performance of an isolated auction may be positive, the longterm effect may turn out negative due to performance losses
in future auctions.
This leads us to introduce a concept we call the
‘informational balance of power’. In every auction setting,
each participants in this auction (either bidder or bid taker)
has some information about the other participants. This
means that there is a certain balance of power involved: do I
know more about this participant than he knows about me?
The revelation of information by a participant can tilt this
informational balance of power if something significantly
new is learned from this by other participants. Specifically for
information revealed by the bid taker, we have the following
proposition.

Proposition 4: The information feedback policy that is chosen
by the bid taker will be such that it preserves the
informational balance of power.

Subsequent research needs to address several things. The
ratings in Table 1 have been arrived at through simple,
somewhat ad hoc judgments. A more rigorous
operationalization of the informational content of feedback is
needed. Also, propositions 1-4 need validation. We are
planning a series of laboratory experiments in the spring of
2000 to validate propositions 1-3. We will run an electronic
multidimensional auction with student subjects bidding under
various information feedback policies. Proposition 4 cannot
be adequately validated in a lab experiment, since it is hard to
reproduce the proper social settings that are crucial to
analyzing the informational balance of power. We are
currently negotiating with an electronic auction provider to
either set up a field experiment testing proposition 4 or
conduct a case study of a multi-round procurement auction to
gain insight into participants’ perception of the informational
balance of power and changes therein. Hopefully the
validation and further development of these aspects will help
theorists and practitioners with the many design issues faced
when developing and analyzing electronic auctions.
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